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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of the Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to 
request that prospective juror Progess be removed for cause or 
failing to remove him by peremptory challenge. To make such a 
showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance, falling below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's 
performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. Deland, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah 
1988). The appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law. 
State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32 [^20, 984 P.2d 376. Preservation of 
Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: issues involving 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel constitute an exception to 
the preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
2. Whether the trial court committed plain error by not pursuing the 
dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to that of the other 
prospective jurors. In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1993), 
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this Court outlined the following principles involved in determining 
whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and 
to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was 
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the 
following (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) The error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, or confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. 
Id. At 1208-09 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: Issues 
involving plain error constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such 
may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provision, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulation, or case 
law whose interpretation is determinative, are set out verbatim, with the 
appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant alleges this case involves the failure to remove a prospective 
juror for cause or by peremptory challenge. Appellant alleges these failures 
precluded Defendant of the right to a fair trial. 
Defendant was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a disable or Elder Adult 
and Assault. He pleaded not guilty to the charges. 
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Defendant subsequently appeared for a jury trial. At the conclusion of trial, 
Defendant was convicted on both counts. 
On that same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant as follows; Based on 
the conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or Elder Adult, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to a term of 365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it 
suspended 325 days; and as to the conviction of Assault, the trial court sentenced 
Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court 
suspended. Defendant thereafter filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Jacobsen was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or Elder 
Adult in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-111 (3) (a), a class A 
misdemeanor, and Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, a 
class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
2. On September 29, 2003, Mr. Jacobsen appeared before the district court 
and pleaded not guilty (R. 10-11). 
3. Mr. Jacobsen appeared for a jury trial on April 16, 2004 (R. 67-70). 
4. During jury selection the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether 
any of them have close friends or family members that work in law 
enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). Prospective juror John Richard Progess 
responded that he had " close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol." 
(R. 117:21:14-15). 
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5. The trial court asked Mr. Progess if he would "be inclined to give more 
credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed to a lay witness in 
court." (R. 117:22:1-3). Mr. Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd 
give more credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail a 
little bit more than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6). 
6. The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the proceedings, would 
your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense: (R. 
117:22:7-8). Mr. Progess responded, "No." (R. 117:22:9). 
7. The final six persons selected to sit on the jury included Mr. Progess (R. 
117:39:14-16). 
8. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Jacobsen on both 
counts. (R. 117:132:2-8). 
9. That same day, the trial court imposed sentence. (R. 68). Based on the 
conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a disabled or Elder Adult, the trial 
court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of 365 days in the Davis County 
Jail, of which it suspended 325 days. (R. 68). As to the conviction of 
Assault, the trial court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of 180 days in 
the Davis County Jail, which the trial court suspended. (R. 67-70). 
10. Mr. Jacobsen filed a timely prose notice of appeal (R. 71). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Defendant Alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel by failing to request that prospective juror Progess 
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be removed for cause of failing to remove him by peremptory 
challenge. The trial counsel's failure to request that Progess be 
removed for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge 
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment. 
Even with the removal of Progess the result at trial would not have been 
different. 
2. The trial court did not commit plain error by not pursuing the dismissal 
of prospective juror Progess similar tot hat of the other prospective 
jurors. The Trial court did not need to do further questioning of and 
dismissal of prospective juror Progess even though the trial court 
pursued such questioning of and dismissal of other prospective jurors. 
Finally, there was no error found. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT DENY Mr. JACOBSEN OF HIS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST 
THAT PROSEPECTIVE JUROR PROGESS BE DISMISSED 
FOR CAUSE OR FOR FAILING TO REMOVE HIM BY 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE. 
In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a 
defendant must show: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient by 
falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) trial 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by depriving him 
of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, (1984). If the 
defendant fails to establish either of the two parts of the Strickland test, 
counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and an appellate court 
need not address the other part of the test. 
Respecting the first prong of the Strickland test: 
"we must indulge in the strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 
might be considered sound trial strategy." 
State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App. 511,153 P.3d 804, at P17, citing State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Respecting the second prong of Strickland, "to demonstrate 
prejudice,' Defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
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but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." State v. Alfatlawi, supra at PI7, citing State v. 
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426 at P55. 
The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is reserved for 
"the few context where ineffective assistance is 'presumed,' such as where 
counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused 
during a critical stage of the proceeding, ... and where counsel is burdened 
by an actual conflict of interest." State v. Alfatlawi, supra at PI 7, citing 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 381 n.6, (1986) 
First, trial counsel's failure to remove a particular juror is presumed 
to be the product of a conscious choice or preference." State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76 P20, 12 P.3d 92. Second, because jury selection is" highly 
subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process, trial counsel's presumable 
conscious and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular juror is 
further presumed to constitute effective representation." Id. Therefore, "it 
follows that the decision not to remove a particular juror need only be 
plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is ordinarily 
presumed." Id. At P25. 
To establish that trial counsel was inattentive, Defendant must show 
either "a specific and clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused 
the failure to object to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally 
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failed to participate in meaningful way in the process as a whole." Id. at 
P25n. 10. 
Appellant argues that trial counsel's failure to object was the 
deficient performance and implies that not saying anything during the voir 
dire process showed indifference. But the record doesn't support that 
inference. The record establishes that the Trial Court was taking the 
appropriate steps to ensure Defendant received a fair trial. Under such 
circumstances, it was a wise trial strategy to choose to remain silent and let 
the Judge do his job, then interrupt for no reason and risk alienating the jury 
pool. 
To conclude juror bias, it is not appropriate to focus exclusively on a 
prospective juror's initial answer over the prospective juror's whole 
conversation with the court. As the Alfatlawi Court stated, "Although 
Juror Ten's initial comments may have raised some questions about his or 
her impartiality, the record does not show a bias" so strong or unequivocal 
as to inevitably taint the trial process." P.21. The Alfatlawi court considered 
the whole conversation between the prospective juror and the judge, and on 
the whole, concluded there was no bias. In the instant case, the whole 
conversation between prospective juror Progess and the court shows Mr. 
Progess would not be biased in favor of the prosecution. 
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in 
the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the 
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judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury 
acted according to law. 
Defendant also cannot demonstrate that the trial court's alleged error 
caused prejudice. The simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to 
law enforcement does not establish bias. 
"Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court 
have upheld denials of motions to strike law 
enforcement personnel for cause when 
questioning on voir dire dispels any suggestion 
of bias raised by the prospective juror's law 
enforcement back ground." 
State v. Ramos, 882 P12d 149, 152 (Utah Ct. App 1994). 
During jury selection in the instant case, the trial court asked the 
prospective jurors whether any of them have close friends or family 
members that work in law enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). Prospective 
juror John Richard Progess responded that he had a "close friend that's on 
the Utah Highway Patrol." (R. 117:21:14-15). 
The trial court asked Progess if he would "be inclined to give more 
credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed to a lay witness in 
court." (R. 117:22:1-3). Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd give more 
credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail a little bit more 
than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6). 
9 
The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the proceedings, 
would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense?" (R. 
117:22:7-8). Progess responded, "No." (R. 117:22:9). 
Progess' unequivocal "No." established he was not biased for the 
prosecution. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984), held:, 
(b) with regard to the required showing of 
prejudice, the proper standard requires the 
defendant to show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confine in the outcome. A court 
hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider 
the totality of the evidence before the judge or 
jury. Pp. 691-696. 
Appellant failed to address this prong of Strickland. But the record 
establishes Defendant's culpability, and as such Defendant has failed to 
establish that if there was an error, it was prejudicial. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY 
NOT PURSUING THE DISMISSAL OF PROSPECTIVE 
JUROR PROGESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE OTHER 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS. 
In State v. Alfatlawi, 153 P.3d 804, P17, Utah App.,2006, to 
establish plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that 
was not properly objected to, a defendant must show that: (1) an error 
exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the defendant. 
"It is generally inappropriate for a trial 
court to interfere with counsel's conscious 
choices in the jury selection process . . . . Only 
where a juror expresses a bias or conflict of 
interest that is so strong or unequivocal as to 
inevitably taint the trial process should a trial 
court overrule trial counsel's conscious decision 
to retain a questionable juror." Id. 
Defendant also cannot demonstrate that the trial court's alleged error 
caused prejudice. The simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to 
law enforcement does not establish bias. State v. Alfatlawi, supra at p22, 
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 152 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
Rule 18 (e) (13) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allows a challenge for cause to be 
taken where a juror has "formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty." And, of 
course, a juror must be willing to apply the law 
as instructed by the court. nl6 These principles 
are implicit in rule 18 (e) (14) of the Utah Rules 
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of Criminal Procedure, which provides in part 
that a challenge for cause is proper where "a 
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which 
will prevent him form acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging [the juror]." "Impartiality" 
has been defined as a mental attitude of 
appropriate indifference. nl7 
Once comments are made which facially raise a 
question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of 
discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is 
removed by the court or unless the court or 
counsel investigates further and finds the 
inference rebutted; rebuttal of such an inference 
may be accomplished by a showing that the 
statement was merely the product of a "light 
impression" and not one that would "close the 
mind against the testimony that may be offered 
in opposition." nl 8 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, (UT 1988) 
It is a long standing rule of law that having formed an opinion alone 
will not be a basis for disqualification: 
"no person shall be disqualified as a juror by 
reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury [juror], founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public journals, or 
common notoriety; provided it appear to the 
court, upon his declaration, under oath or 
otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding 
such an opinion, act impartially and fairly upon 
the matters submitted to him. The challenge 
may be oral, but must be entered in the minutes 
of the court or the phonographic reporter." 
(Laws 1884, p. 124.) 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, (UT 1994) 
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A defendant waives error by exercising peremptories to achieve an 
impartial jury. As the authorities embraced in Menzies explain, "So long as 
the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a 
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
[Constitution] was violated." Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887). After 
Menzies, "to prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a 
juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a 
member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 889 P.2d 393 (UT 1994) 
As stated in Argument I, Progess' unequivocal "No" established he was 
not biased for the prosecution. The Trial Court had no reason to remove 
Progess. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant has no bases for error, and we 
respectfully request that this Court keep said judgment as is. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of April, 2007 
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Brandon L. Poll 
Attorney for Appellee 
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